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comment
Quality of education is currently receiving a lot
of attention from the news media. One picks up
Time or Harper's and reads that college students
are having a hard time reading or writing properly,
or, perhaps, one is confronted with an editorial or
article suggesting that the general level of the
quality of education available in our colleges and
universities is declining. This decline should be
quite real for us at Calvin; a great number of
students leave here after their four year stint with
only a slight increase in their intellectual or
academic prowess.
One significant cause of the decline in the level
of the quality of education (at least at Calvin
College) is student passivity. It seems that most
enrollees come to Calvin ·to get taught (i.e. to get
by), if, indeed, they are at all academically
motivated in their enrollment. Note the passive
voice of the verb in the previous sentence. People
do not come to Calvin to learn; they come to get
taught. The common goal seems to become filled
with some tangible knowledge which will someday
be translatable into dollars and cents.
It must be readily .admitted that passivity is not
peculiar to Calvin College. It is· most certainly a
recognizable characteristic of American life. Americans participate, for the most part,. only in spectator sports, and most of that participation occurs
in an easy chair while images of the sporting event
are sent to their titillated minds via television. How
often does the average American read a book? How
often does he ask himself questions regarding the
nature of his existence? The sorry answer is, I'm
afraid, reflected in the great number of blue-lit
living rooms visible on Main Street USA on any
given night.
This passive mentality is manifested at Calvin
College in a number of concrete forms. ·One
manifestation is visible in the functional problems
which Dialogue is experiencing. Passivity is the
reason Dialogue has to squeeze the campus to
extract an opinion. Student passivity is the reason
that faculty works have been appearing more often
in Dialogue than have student works. Passivity
causes students to react to Dialogue articles with a
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superficial "Oh, I liked that piece" or with an "I
thought it was a terrible (note the descriptive
precision of the diction) article." Passivity is why
Dialogue is only a dialogue in name.
The truly frightening aspect of this passivity is.
its academic manifestations here at Calvin. A
college should be a center for the debate of new
ideas as well as a place to learn about discovered
truths. A Christian liberal arts college has unique .
and often conflicting sets of theories to reconcile.
It must synthesize contemporary secular thought
. and problems with its special Christian philosophy
in order to cope with the realities of the times. Is it
not then ironic that upperclassmen don't know
how to speak or are afraid to speak in class?
Shouldn't we be frightened when great works of
literature cannot drag even a slight reaction from
an English major? What has happened at Calvin
College to cause students in the classroom to be
able to only barely tolerate other students who
raise matters for discussion or who even (how
elitist!) make a comment to add a point of
information. Is it not appalling that at a college a
comment in the classroom draws raised eyebrows
rather than serving to stimulate discussion?· Is it
not the epitome of boorishness for students to pack
up their books before the hour is over, while the
professor is still speaking?
All the signs indicate that life for the majority of
middle-class students at Calvin College is self-evident and boring. Education only presents them
with tedious arguments which, if they get involved
in, will lead to overwhelming questions. When a
few students do air their opinions or do participate
in their educational experience, the great majority
of the student body feels threatened. Painfully
overwhelming questions are raised, but in reply, for
purposes of distraction, the passive students raise
only superficial questions. There is no dominant
elite at Calvin College except in the minds of those
people who, for one reason or another, are afraid
of participation. The question we must ask ourselves is whether or not we dare disturb the
umverse.
Don Hettinga
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Janet Hagedorn
Dialogue welcomes the use of this space for · informal.
contributions.
In this essay, Steve Mulder, a junior from Grand Rapids,
comments on a reading of Lillian Hellman's Little Foxes, a
play to be produced by Thespians Nov. 13-15 & 20-22.

The Importance of Water
in The Little Foxes
It's rather difficult to be real objective about a work of
art when it's experienced in the bathtub. I mean, you're in
such close contact with your immediate environment (that
nice, hot water) that it's bound to affect your judgement,
so I knew I was taking a terrible chance when I opted for
reading Lillian Hellman's The Little Foxes in the tub. Still,
it was Thursday, the deadline was Friday, and I really was
in great need of a bath, so, with the thought of killing two
birds with one stone, I took that chance.

During the whole of the first act the water was hot and
still relatively clean, and the play was great. I guess I'm
always charmed by the South and under the circumstances
was especially charmed. The play opened as the big business
deal was-closed with all of our favorite Southern characters
present: Regina, the self-assured, if a little over the hill,
southern belle; her bourgeouis up-and-coming brothers,
Oscar and Ben; Oscar's wife; the broken and burned out
aristocrat Birdie; a son; a daughter; and a goodly number
of black servants/ slaves. Things were looking good, and I'd ·
even remembered to take the shampoo out of the medicine
chest before I got in so as to have it close at hand.
· By the second act, however, the characters had developed pretty well and were beginning to look almost as rigid
as the wrinkles forming in my fingers. The water was only
lukewarm when Regina's husband, Horace, arrived on the
scene and the story-line really began to take shape. The plot
thickened throughout the second act, and when the curtain
fell, the sides had formed in earnest; the good guys were
good, the bad were bad, and the water was cold.
Maybe it was just that cold water, but I had pretty well
lost interest when the plot broke open in the third and final
act, for I had never developed any real sympathy for or
affinity with any of the characters. Hellman writes in
Pentimento, her collection of personal memoirs:
I had meant to half-mock my own youthful high-class
innocence to Alesandra, the young girl in the play; I had
meant people to smile at, and to sympathize with, the
sad, weak Birdie, certainly I had not meant them to cry;
. I had meant the audience to recognize some parts of ·
themselves in the money-dominated Hubbards; I had not
menat people to think of them as villians to whom they
had no connection.
I personally felt little . connection with any of the
characters who, for the most part, left me cold, and I think
Hellman failed on this score. Or was I just disgusted by cold
bath water and by the sure knowledge that the ring from
my marathon bath would require a good half hour of
scrubbing?
Steve Mulder
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Joel Kuipers

Furiously
Sleeping
Ideas

-a look at Noam Chomsky
As a result of some recent work in
linguistics, we now know more about
the nature of man's most distinctive
feature-language-more about the
human mind, and perhaps, more about
how people fit into the rest of the
natural world. The work of Noam
Chomsky, in particular, has shed light
on the distinctive character of human
language, as opposed to other forms of
animal communication, and how this
language can reveal the workings of'
the · human brain. Moreover, Chomsky's work looms important as an
attack on the extreme behaviorist assumptions endemic in the social sciences today, as well as a powerful and
effective tool for rebuilding some traditional conceptions of the dignity and
uniqueness of man.
II
To a theologian, the dignity of man
probably contains at least two important features: man's free will and
man's special place in the scheme of
creation. Although Chomsky's initial
aim was not to champion the cause of
those resentful of the scientific attacks
on these features, the significance of
his work, however, is quite dramatic
when one considers the serious blows
man's dignity has suffered through the
course of history. Probably the first
real damage to man's collective ego
came from Copernicus-who impolitely informed us that we were no
longer the center of the universe, and
that the earth, like any other planet,
obediently orbited the sun. Two hundred years later, another such blow
came from Darwin's Origin of the
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Species, which placed man in a biological relationship to the apes, which for
many, was too close for comfort.
But, as Chomsky would say, the
worst attack of all, and false to boot,
has come from the extreme developments of the behaviorism of Pavlov,
.Watson, and Skinner, which icily state
·that f!lan is nothing but a delicate
response mechanism who is finely, but
inextricably, tuned to the push and
pull of the environment. Under this
view, man becomes what Shakespeare
called a "bare forked animal," stripped
of his will and even of his distinctiveness. Man is merely able to respond,
marionette-like, to the environment,
forever caught in the web of stimulusresponse. The present state of man's
dignity, at least of the eyes of large
portions of the scientific community,
is surely on shaky ground.
Nor is man's uniqueness unchallenged. In an article which appeared in
August-September, 1975 issue of
Natural History, Stephen Gould examines man's three main claims to
uniqueness (as he sees them): anatomical discontinuity between man and
ape, conceptual uniqueness, and "overall" genetic differences. None of these
claims, says Gould, can withstand
close scrutiny. For example, when the
chimpanzee Lana, "star pupil of the
Yerkes Laboratory, begins to ask for
the names of objects she has not
previously seen," Gould concludes
that we can no longer "deny to animals the capacity to conceptualize and
abstract." 1 The anatomical and genetic claims to uniqueness also fall to

some persuasive reasoning. Although
he jokingly concedes that "the next
president of our country will not
belong to another species," Gould
suggests that "if we could only find a
different way of communicating with
them," we may find ourselves "more
nearly akin to the chimpanzee than
even Huxley would care to admit." 2
It may be true that man's resemblance to the ape and to the machine
are greater than we suspected. If it is,
then we must face the facts honestly
and head-on, as people eventually did
after the Corpernican and Darwinian
bombshells. After all, it is not degrading or cynical to accept man as he
is, but honest and even reverent.
But, as a small but important group
of people are discovering, those behavioristic emphases do not adequately
represent the facts of human nature.
These people, led by Noam Chomsky,
are not outraged theologians, philosophers, or d.rtists, but are scientists
who derive their information from, of
all things, the study of English grammar. Anyone who hated grammar
from the day they set eyes on a noun
or a verb is probably wondering:
"What could grammar have to do with
anything?" ·
The idea of examing language to get
at the peculiar character of human
nature, however, is not particularly
new. Indeed, even the earliest speculators on man's uniqueness sensed that
language was an element which ·
marked him . off from the rest of
creation. For example, J .R. Firth tells
how the Egyptians regarded language

Far from being explainable,

as associated with a god, Thoth:
He was the heart and tongue of
Ra, and the means whereby the
will of God was pronounced ,
and having been pronounced, became effective in creation. Nature and its creatures animate or
inanimate could not be said to
have an existence until his name
was called. He uttered the words
which created our world. 3
Civilization in Babylon ·also began w_ith
the language-giving god, Oannes-halfman, half-fish, who swam up the Persian Gulf and taught Babylonians the
use of writing and other arts. Even in
the Christian tradition, one could
interpret the opening lines of the
Gospel of John to mean, "in the beginning there was languagt:."
But not all observers saw language
as such a unifying enterprise of mankind. According to the author of
Genesis (Moses), the linguistic confusion which God imposed on the early
peoples of the earth at Babel is responsible for the diversity, not just
amongst languages, but amongst tribes,
nations, cultures.
At Babel, languages became so
varied and complexly diverse that men
saw themselves as not the same, after
all, but completely different. Perhaps
this was the meaning of Babel-that an
essentially unified species chose to
view itself as diverse, discrete elements, each incommensurate with the
other.
Allowing now for a historical jump,
the twentieth-century observers of
human behavior are still puzzling over
this same vast variety, and many construct their own myths of Babel. In
particular, the so-called structuralist
school of linguistics as led by Leonard
Bloomfield was influential in spreading
the idea that languages have almost
nothing in common but are defined as
a system of discrete parts, analyzable
only on its own terms. Moreover, this
system was seen to operate in a mechanical fashion which was accessible to
manipulation and control. It was these
methods and theories which eventually
Chomsky so brilliantly opposed.
III
When Bloomfield and his colleagues
first encountered the wealth of linguis-

tic diversity among the American Indians, they soon discovered that many
languages just didn't work like Latin
did. Try as they might, the attempt to
analyze Navaho in terms of the Latin
of Cicero and Virgil seemed bound to
fail. They ·decided, then, that every
language must be considered on its
own terms, with a system unique and
sufficient to itself. (This theory, incidentially, was instrumental in combating the then prevalent racist views
which held that many "primitive"
languages were inferior, lacking definite sound systems.) Even though
some features of language may appear
to be widespread, Bloomfield concluded that "the only useful generalizations about language are inductive
generalizations" because "features .
which we think ought to be universal
may be absent from the very next
language that becomes accessible. " 4
With that, Bfoomfield, _and much of
modern linguistics, marched off down
a path of strict empiricism and behaviorism . Although their concern was
primarily with methodology and not
theory, they did make certain important assumptions which informed the
character of their subsequent work.
They assumed, for example, that since
only data (read: behavior) which is
directly observable can be valid, language consists, then, of observable
sequences of sounds, categorized into
discrete, constituent parts. With this
type of assumption, the linguist becomes a sort of verbal botanist, categonzmg and classifying only those
elements which are accessible to observation.
Since the concern of the structuralists was to elevate linguistics to
the exalted · status of science, they
strove for the rigor of the physical
sciences. This rigor, of course, required
some strict theoretical housekeeping
and many traditional ideas were swept
out the door. The idea of mind, for
example, was simply abandoned, as
were as other vague, non-observable
entities. The behavior of any organism,
Bloomfield felt, could be much more
effectively accounted for in' terms of
stimulus-response. Stimulus-response
was seen to work in a very precise,
mechanical fashion, much like the
physical laws of physics and chemistry, and it lent itself well to direct

observation. Under th is view, an organism's capacity to learn may be
explained "in much the same way as
one might explain how a thermostat
'learns' to respond to changes in temperature and switch a furnace on or

off. ,,s

The way that children learn language is also based on the thermostat
idea, with a few variations. The environment acts as a climate of linguistic stimuli which adjust his language
behavior. For example," . . . [a childl
says 'Daddy bringed it,' he merely gets
a disappointing answer such as 'No!
You must say Daddy brought it';" 6
and if he says it correctly, he gets a
favorable stimulus-reinforcement, such
a·s "Yes, Daddy brought it," etc. One
important addition to this notion is
the principle of analogic creation,
which is the principle by which children arc said to be able to u ndcrstand
and produce sentences, that arc new to
their experience.
Analogic creation rests on the idea:
that we store previously heard · sentences and words, and we associate
them by analogy in order to create
new sentences. For example, the sentence "John can fix the car" might be
created from the sentences "Dave can
fix the bicycle," "Dave can fix the
car," and "John can fix the bicycle"
(In mathematical notation, it might
look like a proportion: A:B = C:X).
The result, "John caf'! fix the car" is a
sentence new to the speaker's experience. From this process which, incidentally, is not beyond the capacity
of certain higher animals, man creates
the wide variety- of sentences observable in a language. The creativity of
language use, thus described, is a trait
which is easily programmed on a computer.
These are the views of some other
speculators on human behavior. Like
early Egyptians, Babylonians, and
Hebrews, the behaviorists· try to account for why people do what they
do. Bloomfield, Skinner, and associates have gained an immense amount·
of popularity in the past few years,
moving towards gre2.ter accuracy, predictability, and control of human language. Theirs is a view that explicitly
rejects traditional ways of looking at
human behavior in favor of mechanistic ones. It is a view we must get

predictable, and controllable in terms of reinforcement laws

useJ to, to some extent.
Perhaps it is not important to distinguish man as unique. Perhaps it is
not important to . have s9me vague
sense of dignit_y to share with the rest
of the species. Perhaps, like the characters in the final scene of the movies·
Nasbvill,•, it is not important to have
an i<lca of free will. Perhaps there arc
ways of mollifying the humanists,
theologians, and scientists with some
grand notion that the mechanistic behavioristic conception of man is better
for the world anyway. Maybe we
should brighten up, distribute copies
of Skinner's Waldn1 II, cast a vote for
the utopian future, and leave the rest
to the experts. This, it would seem, is
the general direction of behaviorism at
the moment.

Chomsky reveals not only the inadequacy of the stimulus-response model,
but also his mastery of the literature
of cognitive psychology. B.F. Skinner,
a leading exponent of the extreme
behaviorist approach to language has
acquired a surprising degree of prominence in professional and lay circles
for his theories on human behaviorverbal and otherwise. His prominence
seems especially surprising in the light
of Chomsky's brilliant but devastating
review.
Chomsky demonstrates some fundam_ental problems of the stimulusresponse model, and then goes on to
show that Skinner's use of the words
stinrnlus, response, and reinforcement,
and of many other terms is so vague
and lacking in any objectivity that the

lem is to use his terms inconsistently.
Chomsky concludes that Skinner's
formulation "covers almost no aspect
of linguistic behavior, [and] ... it is
no more scientific than the traditional
approaches to this subject matter, and
rarely as clear and careful."~
The book Verbal Bebavior gets
much of its persuasive power from the
forcefulness of its claims. In the first
chapter of Verbal -Behavior, Skinner
makes the astounding claim that "the
basic processes which give verbal
behavior its spedal characteristics are
now fairly well understood. Although
much of the work responsible for this
advance has been carried out on other
species ... the results have proved to
be surprisingly free of species restrictions. " 9 In other words, Skinner is

:.. the structuralists were looking at the performance
of the. speaker but were failing
to consider his competence ...
IV
Probably the first thing Chomsky
noticed about the behavioristic account of human language was that
although its methodology worked relatively well for categorizing the so1111d
systems o"f languages, it failed to give
an adequate account of the immense
variety and creativity involved in linguistic formulations on the sente11ce
level. As he tugged on this loose
thread, the structure of behaviorism
began to unravel.
Chomsky, trained and nurtured
within the structuralist system, soon
became dissatisfied with many of its
formulations. First of all, he discovered that although empirical accounts of language catalogued the
observed patterns of sentence construction within a language, they failed
to give a description of the unobserved; yet possible, ways that sentences could be formed within a language. In short, the structuralists were
looking at the performance of the
speaker but were failing to consider his
competence. After all, Chomsky said,
it is the competence that determines
the performance of the speaker.
In a now-classic review of B.F.
Skinner's book Verbal Behavior,

terms have only trivial meanings, if
any. He then examines Skinner's
notion of control of verbal behavior
and finally, implies some of his own
ideas on innatism and the worth of
traditional formulations.
The stimulus-response, mechanistic
view of human behavior, while neat in
theory, has some important problems.
These are not problems which can be
solved by further research but are
intrinsic to the behavioristic model.
For example; in defining the terms
stin111lus-resp011se, one must decide if
la) any physical event is to be called a
. stimulus or 1 b) only one to which the
organism reascts. Secondly, one must
decide if 2a) any behavior is to be
called a response, or only 2b) behavior
connected with the stimuli in lawful
ways. If Skinner accepts la) and 2a)
then he must conclude that a large
part of anything the organism does is
simply not lawful (i.e. there will
necessarily be many stimuli to which
the organism will not respond).
On the other hand, if Skinner
accepts the narrower definitions of 1 b
and 2b, then, obviously, anything the
organism does is lawful by definition;
but this fact is of "limited significance,
since most of what the animal does
will simply not be considered be!JL1vior. " 7 Skinner's solution to this prob-

saying that the basic properties involved in language are not unique to
human beings but could also exist in
rats, pigeons, armadillos, etc. This is
ridiculous. As Chomsky points out, if
Skinner were right, it would be very
odd that language is limited to man (If
language were so easily acquired by
other species, one wonders why an ape
hasn't written a book about psychology).
Skinner also claims that . through
the manipulation of variables and controlling stimuli, he can evoke or control verbal behavior 10 (Since thinking,
as Bloomfield suggests, is merely "talking with concealed musculature,"
thought control would be a very logical next step). But the methods Skinner suggests for getting a response are
less than sophisticated. To get the
response pe11cil, he suggests saying to
the subject, "Please say pencil" or, to
make a large and conspicuous pencil
available in an unusual place ("half
submerged in an aquarium") with signs
reading PENCIL, and "PEN and ... "
and perhaps having voices in the background (echoic stimuli) saying "pencil,
pencil." 11 It is this lack of rigor that
Chomsky called mere "playacting at
science." 12
Even more interesting, I think, than
Chomsky's rebuttal of Skinner, are his

or stimulus-response, language, in its essential character,

implicit suggestions as to what he
considers some really important
motives for human behavi~H. Although
he does not state it in so many words,
Chomsky suggests that curiosity,
desire to imitate, and desire for novel. ty and n~w experience represent important but often overlooked motives
for behavior. As examples, he suggests,
"we recognize people and places to
whic~ we have given no particular
attention. We can look up something
in a book and learn it perfectly well
with no other motive than to confute
reinforcement theory, or out of boredome, or idle curiosity." 13 These
motives do not suggest the image of a
person caught in the network of reinforcement and stimulus-response, but
a person capable of free, spontaneous,
responsible behavior.
Again, it is important to emphasize
the fact that Chomsky does not speak
from the standpoint of an outraged
humanist but as a scientist presenting
the results of his findings. And these
findings are, I think, impressive.
V

Almost everyone has had the experience of meeting a person who, at
first glance, seemed very simple and
easily placeable into some character
type, social class, and say, inco_m e
bracket. But after getting to know that
person in more detail, you came to
realize how his or her history contributed to those initial impressions and
indeed, may have found that the sur~
face features did not have the meanings that you thought they did.
Allowing somewhat for metaphorical license, Chomsky says that ·the
study of language is like that. He says
that underneath the surface features of
language (the sounds) is a deeper,
abstract system of meanings which is
related to the surface by a history of
rules and mental events. An example
of this difference between surface
structure and deep structure might be
seen in the sentences
John is easy to please.
and John is eager to please.

On the surface, both of these sentences have the form noun + copula +
adjective + infinitive verb. However,

this description does not show the
underlying deepf?r structure. When the
sentences are looked at more carefully,
it becomes clear that Jobn in the first
sentence is the direct object of the
verb to please; i.e. it is easy for
someone to please John. In the second
·sentence, John is the subject; i.e. John
is the one who would do the pleasing.
A surface account of these sentences
would not reveal these differences. It
seems, then, that to have a truly
adequate account of language, one
must describe the internal relaitons of
a sentence which happen on the level
of deep structure.
The example above demonstrates
how similar structures conceal underlying differences. But Chomsky also ·
notes how surface differences in some
cases conceal underlying similarities.
For example
The car hit Bob.
and Bob was hit by the car.

Although the sentences are very differen·t in appearance, somehow intuitively
we "know" that these sentences are
similar in meaning. Chomsky represents
these similarities through the application of a grammatical operation called
trans[or111ation.
One f1nal example will show how

underneath the surface
is a deeper
abstract meaning.
he accounts for these amazing phenomena. In his article, Language and
the Mind, he gives the three sentences
1. I told John to leave.
2. I expected John to leave.
3. I persuaded John to leave.

all of which seem to have the same
syntactic structure. But if one performs an equivalent grammatical operation on all of them, the similarities fall
apart. One example should suffice:
paraphrases:
1. What I told John was to leave
(acceptable)
2. What I expected John was to
leave (not acceptable)
3. What I persuaded Jobrz was to
leave (not acceptable). 14

is innovative and stimulus free.

Sentence #1 survives the operation
with its meaning intact, but sentence
#2 and #3 do not. Why is this? If they
all have the same grammatical structure, shouldn't an operation performed on all of them produce similar
paraphrases?
The answer to this question must
be that the speaker somehow "knows"
the rules by which he sorts out the
proper from· improper paraphrases.
Even though a native sp·eaker needs no
special training to understand these
examples, he is in control of a set of
highly abstract and complex set of
ruies. Still more impressive is the fact
that even if the sentences were riew to
his experience, they would be "interpreted by the native speaker instantaneously and uniformly, in accordance
with structural principles that are
known tacitly, intuitively, and unconsciously."15
This suggests that English grammar
up until now has not really provided
an accurate account of our language. A
true grammar would represent all that
a speaker knows consciously or u~consciously about his language. It would
represent, in other words, a system of
rules, conscious or unconscious for
establishing correlations between surface structure and deep structure,sound-ineaning correlations. A true
grammar could be thought of as the
description of the principles by which
a speaker interprets a given utterance
and assigns meaning to it, in other
words, it is the speakers' theory of
language.
As the examples illustrated, there are
principles operating on a deep lev~l of
language which are not accessible to
direct, empirical observation in the
surface of the utterance. The underlying rules or principles are so highly
abstract that it would seem extremely
odd that, as Skinner and Bloomfield
suggest, a child five or six years old
learns such a system solely on the basis
of extrinsic, accidental associations
occuring in his environment. And since
a normal child is not capable of such a
remarkable intellectual feat in any
other domain of experience, Chomsky
concludes "It is unimaginable that a
highly abstract, and tightly organized
language comes by accident into the
mind of every four year old child."
There. must be some innate restrictions

It is innovative in the sense

which form language.
Another aspect of Chomsky's work,
which is simply rife with humanistic
implications, is what he calls the creative aspect of language use. Far from
being explainable, predictable, and
controllable in terms of reinforcement
laws or stimulus-1'esponse, language, in
its essential character, is innovative
and stimulus free. It is innovative in
the sense that from a finite system of
grammatical · rules of the type just
suggested, we can produce and understand an infinite number of sentences,
many of which are new to our experience. Language is stimulus free in the
sense that "the principles operating in

VI
Noam Chomsky leads a double life.
It is not a double life in the Superman/Clark Kent sense-a courageous
crime fighter in one world and a mild
mannered fellow in the other-but it is
more of the Superman/ Aquaman sort
(if that's possible); a courageous (if
outspoken) fighter against falsehood in
both . cases but appearing in different
realms. It may be surprising to some
people, then, that Chomsky is not
only a sort of hero amongst some
(though certainly not all) behavioral
scientists, but also amongst radical

and irresponsibly restrict their attention to what they consider the highly
specific manipulatable motives of
the country in question. They fail to
see any deeper motives, and rarely
appeal to a sense of common morality.
They are, therefore, surprised when,
for example, "the Chinese irrationally
refuse to respond to the schedule of
reinforcement we have prepared for
them. " 20 The tremendous cynicism of
the American foreign policy experts
comes oozing out the pores of the
dead flesh of behaviorism, the stinking
carcass which lies like a blanket on the
country of Vietnam, smothering it.
Whoring after the surfi,1ce features of a

The tremendous cynicism of the American
foreign policy experts comes oozing out
of the pores of the dead flesh of behaviorism ...
these grammars are .not related to
sensory phenomena in any way describable in the terms empmc1st
p~ychology has to offer" 16 i.e. the
principles are quite abstract and are
not mechanistically related to specific
environmental stimuli. What's more,
Chomsky sees no reason to doubt that
if this is true for language, it is also .
"true of other forms of human knowledge."17
The unique character of human
language, and perhaps all of human
knowledge, then, is creativity. This is a
characteristic that both sets man apart
and liberates him in a scientific sense.
It distinguishes man taxonomically
from the rest of the animals because
there are surely no animals capable of
this rule-governed linguistic creativity;
even Lana, "star" chimp of the Yerkes
Laboratory, works with a restricted
group of symbols. It also liberates man
from useless notions of scientific control of mental behavior. If, for example, Stanley Kubrick had read Language and Mind before he made the
movie Clockwork Orange, he might
not have been nearly so convinced of
the possibilities of such extreme
behavioral control. One result of
Chomsky's work is that it shows t.h at
the behaviorism of the type shown in
A Clockwork Orange is, for all practical purposes, not only immoral, but
also impossible.

leftists in the very different realm of
international politics. He has published
widely on the imperialistic policies of
the United States and on other crimes
of state. His book, /l merican Power
and tbe New Mandarins is probably
the most coherent and persuasive con~
demnation of American imperialism
yet available.
He also criticizes the current vogue
for experts and advisors in international politics-a realm where expertise is not possible. The demand for so
called expertise is caused not so much
by the increasing complexities of the
problems, but by the laziness of intellectuals who would rather delegate
responsibilities. "The cult of the expert is both self-serving, for those who
propound it, and fradulent. " 18 It
is self serving because the experts, by
saying they are dealing with highly
specific and involved social problems
which require mastery, are able to
keep themselves in office. It is fraudulent because "to anyone who has any
familiarity with the social and behavioral (or the policy sciences), the claim
that . there are certain considerations
and principles too deep for the outsider to comprehend is simply an
.
a b sur d tty,
unwort h y o f comment. ,,19
Chomsky's attack on the cult of the
expert, I think, is closely aligned with
his attack on behaviorism. The
experts, like behaviorists, irrationally

problem which demands deeper analysis, American experts cynically manipulate the situation for solutions which
serve their own ends.
Although I am on relatively untrod
ground amonst Chomsky's critics
by associating Chomsky's views on
human nature with his political views,
I think that in any case, it can be said .
that his views contain a rebuke for the
Amer.ican intellectual community. Dell
Hymes describes the powerful impact
Chomsky had at the London Lectures
in 1969:
Many ... came to the lectures
moved by the figure of a dramatically successful scholar who
would lay his mind and to some
extent his body on the line for
causes that matter-a man who publically and committedly broke with
the age-old tradition of trahison des
clercs in which so many of us,
recovered from our fright of the
young in the 60's, are beginning to
wallow again, rationalizing our toleration of the intolerable as a d.efense for the academy of civility. 21
Chomsky is a man not only committed
to the ideas that he propounds but
also committed to seeing them happen
in the real world.
In a brilliant essay entitled The
Responsibility of Intellectuals, he
details the way in which Americans,

that f rotn a finite system of grammatical rules, we can

who have the economy, leisure, and
freedom to support a large academic
community, have handled their duties.
Bluntly stating that "it is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the
truth and expose lies," he shows the
many ways in which many prominent
American scholars-Arthur Schlesinger, Henry Kissinger, David Rowehave shirked this duty, and done some
rather substantial lying in their own
. right.
He also develops the theme of an
essay by Daniel Bell entitled The End
of Ideology. The age of ideology it
seems, has ended by general agreement
that every issue must be resolved in its
own terms, by some expert who
knows more about some highly specific field. In sociology and anthropology this is the functionalistic school
of thought; in psychology and linguistics, this is known as behaviorism.
Wherever it appears, it is a movement
away from the free-floating intellectual into the specious realm of the
expert.
What it amounts to is irresponsibility. American intellectuals have lost
any notion of trying to use ideas as

social levers. They see no furth'er need
for a radical transformation in society:
"We may tinker with our way of life
here and there, but it would be wrong
to modify it in a significant way." It is
fashionable to be cynical about the
New Left, and many intellectuals seem
to have a quite utopian faith that
"technical experts will be able to come
to grips with the few problems ·that
still remain. " 21 Complacent and selfsatisfied, American intellectuals have
rejected ideology in favor of a tinkering type of expertise.
Chomsky's thought is characteristically controversial. It is by no
means accepted by all, or even most of
the academic community. But on
whatever topic he chooses to focus the
beacon of his attention, he emerges as
a thoughtful, clear, and articulate
·scholar of considerable importance,
capable of casting light on many current issues. The appeal of Chomsky's
thought comes from his characteristic
way of bringing up humdrum issues
everyone long ago dismissed or accepted with a yawn-issues like innatism
expertise, and ambiguities of Ian~
guage-and recasting them in a new,

socially relevant mold, ready for use.
The impressions he leaves with a
reader are varied but always stimulating. In what is presumably a tribute to
the striking character of Chomsky's
thought, poet John Hollander sums it
up:
Coiled Alizarine 23
for Noam Chomsky

Curiously deep, the slumber of
crimson thoughts.
While breatheless, in stodgy viridian ;
Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
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Her name was Debby. I guess I should tell you that right at
first, bein's that she's the one the whole thing is all about
anyhow.
'Tain't a easy thing for me to talk about, but in a way it's
kinda important for me to tell you 'bout her, 'cause then
maybe you won't get yourself into the same kind o' trouble
like I did. The thing is ... I don't want ta tell you not ta do
it either, 'cause it was worth it-I think-for both of us;
leastways I'm trying to talk myself into thinkin it was
worth it, or something ... probly "or somethin." But
anyhow, I'm gettin aheada myself. I oughta start at the
beginnin.
Like I said, her name was Debby. The first time I met
her, I was just a'sittin at a friend o'mine's house, jes mindin
nobody's business but my ·own, when this girl walks in, jes
like that. She was a pretty ordinary kinda girl, kinda
bubbly-bouncy 'n'all, but okay, I guess. I jes didn't pay her
a whole lot o'mind right then.
Saw her a coupla days later, out on the road, and spent
some time with her, y'know, just talkin some and messin
around some, nothin in particlar, but I ended up invitin her
to a party we was havin that Saturday, same's I would
anybody else; I invite people easy y'know, maybe that's
why I get inta the kinda trouble like I do. Anyhow, I guess
that was my first mistake, if you're thinkin of it in
mistakes, like I sometimes do and I sometimes don't.
Then the party came. 'N' she came. 'N' it came. Not
right away like o'course. It started off okay. We talked
normal party talk for a while, no big deal or nothin, just
ordinary party talk. 'N ,· then the music came, 'n' there
wasn't a whole lot of people dancin, but she felt Ii ke dancin
'n' I felt like dancin so we danced some. Normal party
dance, no big deal. 'N' then I taught her how ta slow dance,
y'know, real close 'n'all. That was my second mistake (if
you're still thinkin mistakes 'n' keepin track). Well, I figger
that's where she started a'fallin, 'n' I got to admit that I
didn't do a real ·good job of catchin her or nothin. Matter
o'fact I kinda liked it 'n' she wasn't a bad slow dancer
either, once she sorta caught on. I shoulda done some
thinkin there I guess-I think. Aw I dunno, I still haven't
figgered it all out.
Well, next thing ya know, the beer was runnin out, so we
hopped in the car ta get some more, and drove down ta the
party store 'n' got some beer 'n' drove back, 'n' pulled the ·
seat back 'n' ... put it this way, the people inside had to
wait a pretty long time for their beer. But it was nice.

Ta make a pretty long story pretty short, it happened
·agin the next day when she come a'visitin, '_n' the day after
when we laid out in the sun 'n' talked some 'n' made people
wait for their beer some, in a manner o' speakin, 'n' the day
after that agin, 'til the weekend come, 'n' I hadta leave,
'cause I was jes there for a coupla weeks ta look the place
over, y'know; so we decided to go campin ta end off my
visit 'n' look _forward ta when I'd be comin back permanent-like ... 'n' no, I don't do that sorta stuff, jes makin
people wait for their beer, no more'n that.
'N' then come g'bye time, 'n' yeah, I'd write, even seeins
I'd be back in a month or so, 'n' yeah I'd look her up agin
'n' all that stuff.
Well, ·1 left, 'n' I had a whole month ta think 'bout all
o'that, 'n' ta think 'bout Debby, 'n' ta think 'bout me, 'n'
ta think 'bout us, 'n' ta do some realizin 'n' stuff, 'n' it
mostly endin up bein that Debby was a nice kid 'n' all but
what was I doin with her. I wasn't ready ta settle down ('n'
still ain't). I got things ta do 'n' places ta see 'n' Debby's
ready ta settle down, 'n' I'm the one she's ready ta settle
down with 'n'-lemme outa here!
So what's I supposed ta do? Jes quit seein her, jes like
that? No way. I ain't never on purpose burnt nobody in my
whole life, 'n' I don't aim ta start now. 'Sides I been burnt
too often not ta know what it's like, 'n' I don't like what
it's like, 'n' I gotta do somethin 'bout it this time.
· So I set myself down, 'n' seeins I was supposed ta write
her anyhow, I wrote her, 'n' I told her why I gotta stop
seein her 'n'all, 'n' that it wasn't her-'n' it wasn't-but that
I couln't handle no big deal thing 'n' this was gettin ta be a
big deal thing, 'n' that we oughta quit now, 'fore anybody's
gonna get burnt worse than they's gonna get burnt now, 'n'
she'd get over it real quick 'n'all, 'n' that I'd still like ta be
friends 'n'all that ?tuff that ya write when ya write them
kinda letters, I guess. Trouble was, I meant it, all o' it.
Well, I come back, 'n' I called her, 'n' I said let's get
together 'n' talk 'bout that letter, 'n' talk 'bout us 'n' all
that. 'N' we did. 'N' 'fore the night was half gone we was
makin people wait for their beer agin; 'n' I'm stuck, 'cause I
still mean it, 'n' I'm 'frajd she still means it, 'n' I think that
we mean different things, 'n' I'm here now so I cain't sit
down 'n' write her another letter nomore, 'cause I done
that a'ready 'n' it didn't work, 'n' I'm normal 'n' I like
makin people wait Jor their beer, 'n' I cain't go _off 'n'
ignore her, 'cause I don't wanta burn her, 'n' what do I do?
I dunno.
·
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Or Decay?

Richard
Tiemersma
The real question, it seems to me, is whether ...
change is beneficial to the language or ·detrimental.
John Ciardi, poet, critic, and regular contributor to the
Saturday Review and its journalistic offspring, once wrote
about a student in one of his writing courses who dropped
the course because of what he considered to be Ciardi's
pedantic approach to language. The student, a navy veteran
of one of our recent wars, had a number of assets that
boded well. for his future as a writer: he had seen a good
deal of action, he had observed carefully and had, conse. quently, acquired an excellent stock of the stuff of which
good fiction is made, and he was already a better-than-average writer when he enrolled in the course.
But when, in criticizing one of the student's early
efforts, Ciardi chided him mildly for having written "We
arrived at our mid-ocean rendezvous," the student was first
bewildered and then, after Ciardi had explained, offended.
The basis of Ciardi's objection was that the word arrived
was a derivation of the Latin ad ripa, meaning "to the
shore" (our word riparian, as in "riparian rights," e.g., the
right of the owner of lakeshore property to fish the
offshore waters, derives from the same source) and, hence,
perhaps not the best word to use in describing what one
does at a rendezvous in mid-ocean.
Even Ciardi, who, like most defenders of the language,
frequently displays a whim of iron, would not have
considered the lapse a capital linguistic crime. What was a
crime in his book, however, was the student's reaction to
the instructor's lighthanded guidance. "Any person," said
Ciardi, in effect, "who lacks enough respect for language to
abandon a nonsensical expression once it's been shown to
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be nonsense ought not to follow writing as a vocation."
This encounter of Ciardi's raises the intriguing question
of where one is to draw the line in acceding to change in
the language. No one, obviously, will seriously argue that a
living language does not change. In fact, change is the very
phenomenon that makes a "living" language alive. The real
question, it seems to me, is whether the change is beneficial
to the language or detrimental: whether the change is a sign
of healthy growth, as in a child developing to physical
maturity; or of deterioration, as in an octogenarian; or,
worse yet, of malignancy, as in a victim of cancer. And I
should like to suggest that any change contributing to
clearer communication of thought and emotion (that being,
after all, the function of languai:;.:!) is to be welcomed, that
any change tending to blur fine distinctions in meaning
should be resisted, and that any change running counter to
rationality or further polluting the environment with ·
meaningless noise ought to be rigorously eradicated.
In the first category, th·ose changes that enable us to say
more clearly what we mean, is a word like disinterested. My
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary shows that around 1612
the word was used to mean "without interest or concern"
and that such a use may by now be obsolete. (But-see
below-the editors reckoned without .the American public
and the American penchant for democracy in all things, not
excluding usage.) The entry continues: "Not influenced by
interest; now always, Unbiased by personal interest 1659."
The latter definition was certainly given wide currency in
the Victorian age by Matthew Arnold's frequent use of the

word to mean "unbiased, objective, not tainted by considerations of personal profit or loss," as in his definition of
culture as the "disinterested pursuit of our total perfec. .... "
non
There was room in the English language,_I think, for a
word lik~ disinterested as distinct from uninterested,
because relatively few of the words that we loosely classify
as "synonyms" are, in fact, synonymous. (See, for example,
the entry under sly in Webster's New World Dictionary.)
The reason is that many so-called synonyms differ subtly
from one another op account of the connotations, the
emotional overtones, that have accrued in the course of the
development of the language. Thus, at least to me,
disinterested connotes a higher degree of integrity than
does impartial, and a less mechanical and purely scientific
view than objective. Impartiality _may be due to a lack of
interest, and objectivity may be due to a similar lack, in this
instance of perhaps quite legitimate emotions. But the _
disinterested person is the one who, like an upright judge,
may well have personal preferences based on bias, family
ties, or whatever, but who, nevertheless, surmounts those
preferences in making his decision.
I must, therefore, agree with Lionel Trilling when, in a headnote to Arnold's "The Function of Criticism at the
Present Time," 1 he writes:
It is a misfortune of the English language in modern
times that the word "disinterested" is commonly confused with the word ·"uninterested." The modern lexicographers who work on, the principle that whatever is
the usage of people is acceptable are beginning to accept
the confusion, and perhaps they are very wise in their

principle, but in this instance the usage of people-or at
least of some people-has deprived us of our only word
for a-very important virtue.
The history of disinterested, then, furnishes us with an
excellent example of two kinds of change-first from
synonymy with uninterested and, currently, back to its
original state as, quite possibly, a substandard substitute for
the word. The first, I repeat, is a welcome change; the
second is not.
On occasion-such are the benefits, as opposed to the
numerous vexations, of a polyglot language-words that
mean the same thing in the parent languages will gradually
take on different meanings in their Anglicized forms; and
that phenomenon, too, is a beneficial kind of change. Take,
for example, the words monologue and soliloquy, the first
of Greek and the second of Latin origin and both meaning
essentially and, so · far as I can discover, _originally "the
speech of one person." (Cf the related dialogue and
colloquy, both of which entail conversation.) Usage, however, especially in a literary context, has le<l to a clear
distinction between the two, monologue implying an
auditor to whom the words are addressed and soliloquy
implying merely thinking aloud with no audience intended.
Thus the personae in Browning's dramatic poems engage in
monologues, whereas the actors in Elizabethan drama
frequently resort to soliloquies to admit the audiencethough decidedly not their fellow-personae-to their innermost thoughts. Again, the distinction between two erstwhile synonyms having been made, and the distinction
having proved useful, if only as a tool for literary criticism,
it would be something of a loss if the two words were to
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revert to their original synonymy.
Change, then, does occasionally-perhaps even frequently-enrich a language by enabling the discriminating 2
user to convey his thought more clearly . But (is it a case of
all appearing yellow to the jaundiced eye?) to the linguistic
conservative it seems that more changes tend toward
eliminating these useful distinctions, and in the process
creating new and slovenly families of not-quite synonyms,
than otherwise.
That is obviously what is happening to the distinction
between imply an-d infer. Until very recently it was
generally agreed that to imply was to hint at and that to
infer was to recognize that hint; or, in other words, that the
speaker or writer implied (something that he preferred not
to state explicitly) a.nd that the auditor or reader inferred.
And, indeed, careful users of language still make the
distinction, though I should not be surprised if the latest
printing of one of the more up-to-date dictionaries were to
list the words as interchangeable, on the dubious grounds
that the masses, including the mass media, were interchanging them.
Now, I would hardly argue that admitting infer to the
language as a synonym for imply would do irreparable
damage to the language. Something, however, will have
been lost if the process becomes irreversible-some subtlety
of meaning that, whatever other function it may serve, still
gladdens the heart and brightens the eye of the connoisseur.
For imply is based on the Latin words meaning "to fold
into," that is, to include under cover, whereas infer derives
from the words meaning "to carry into," or to include
openly : And the latter, it appears to me, is precisely what
one does when he infers what another has implied; he
brings it out into the open, unfolds it from the wrappings
that partially concealed it, and makes visible the details of
something only the outlines of which could previously have
been seen.
Perhaps the disappearance of the intransitive lie ("to
recline") as contrasted to the transitive lay ("to set down")
will not create an unbridgea.ble communication gap, either.
One obvious benefit of such a disappearance would be the
concomitant elimination of the problem of what the past
and the perfect tenses of lie are. But if we are to do away
with the time-honored difference between lie and lay we
ought, I think, to do so on more substantial grounds than
merely that it is difficult for some people to remember the
difference. 3
Rather less innocuous, however, is the threatened loss of
distinction between adjectives complementing "linking"
verbs of the senses, and adverbs modifying "action" verbs
of the senses. I have no strong objections to someone's
saying that I feel "badly," even when my sense of touch is
unimpaired and I am merely suffering from a head cold.
But I should be rather put out if that same person, noting
that my sense of smell was, consequently, affected, were to
reverse the process and spread the word that I smelled
"bad."
Changes such as these, I suggest, do nothing for the
enrichment of the language, and where they are concerned I
echo Samuel Johnson's dictum in the "Preface" to his
Dictionary of tbe English Language ;
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If the changes that we fear be thus irresistible, what
remains but to acquiesce with silence, as in the other
insurmountable distresses of humanity? It remains that
we retard what we cannot repel, that we palliate what
we cannot cure. Life may be lengthened by care, though
death cannot be ultimately defeated; tongues, like
governments, have a natural tendency to degeneration;
we have long preserved our constitution; let us make
some struggles for our language.
Such struggles are particularly worthwhile when we are
confronted with the cacophonous, meaningless din . that
accompanies much of contemporary conversation. An
idiom can be defined as "a group of words violating grammar
or sense or both," and any language which abounds in
such figurative expressions, is, in fact, made richer and
acquires its individuality from their existence. But there
are, I suggest, limits beyond which even idioms ought not
to go in their defiance of sense . . An example currently in
vogue is "center around," a physical impossibility and a
logical abomination. Similarly, although metaphor and
simile, two of the most popular forms of figurative
language, have long been used to say what any rational
being recognizes as literally untrue, there is a point beyond
which even a figure of speech cannot go without assaulting
the rational order of the universe. Ciardi's student who
"arrived at [his] mid-ocean rendezvous" may have only
approached that point. A clergyman acquaintance of mine,
on the other hand, was unquestionably going too far for
rationality to keep up with him when he stated that "some
people sail through life on a bed of roses like a hot knife
through butter."
.
Even more distressing is the present penchant for such
meaningless interjections as y 'know and like. They debase
the linguistic currency of a people, for bad words have a
tendency to drive out the good, just as bad money drives
out the good. Far better, I think, to revert to the traditional
u/J when one's tongue threatens to outrun his mind. Uh, at
least, is generally recognized as meaningless; but you know
and like are words that ought to convey intelligible
messages-and, in a happier day", did.
Let language change, then, as it inevitably will as long as
it continues to live. To try to stop it from changing is, in
any event, as futile as King Canute's efforts to make the
waves stand still. But let those of us, members of an
· academic community, who by virtue of our educational.
opportunities have some choice in the matter do what we
can to insure that the changes that we help to bring about
are the kind that make clear, reasonable discourse more
possible, and not less.
Y'know?
1
G .B. Harrison, ed ., M,1jor British \t''riters, enlarged edition (New
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1959) II, 630.
2
Another example of the kind of pejorative change that words
like villain, boor, and lewd have suffered. Discrimination used to
mean "perception, discernment," basically, a "capacity for making a
judgment." Everyone knows what it "means" today .
3
Weak as the argument based on mere difficulty may be, it is
still preferable to that of an English teacher whom I heard say a few
years ago, "Ever since lay became a noun, I haven't dared bring the
ma.t ter up in class."

Jake Van Wyk is a Calvin College graduate who is completing work for an MFA degree at Western Michigan University. He is teaching a course in design at Calvin this
semester.

Artist's statement:
I am concerned with thought rather thah stab I€ things.
Sometimes my works reflect banal and significant things at
the same time-hard and soft edges, complex and simple
considerations, objective image ideas and individual marks
or marking systems.
With investigation of visual language, I might dislocate
illusory space and soothing design. I'd rather deal with real
time, space, physical material and media application.
As a christian, I cannot overlook paradoxes in people,
institutions, or ideas. My work questions and uses ambiquities in addition to classical images.
Jake Van Wyk
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During college I saw no reason to modify the Babel story
as I had learned it at home and Sunday School: that when
A asked B in Italian for the hammer, B would say in
Norwegian . to C, "What's wrong with A? We both understood him yesterday," whereupon C would complain in
Chinese to D that A and B were putting him' on. D, having
metamorphosed into a Finn since the day before, withdrew
to find others who could understand him, and the next day
the Finns set out to establish Finland and to write a Finnish
grammar. Every other group also migrated, in order to be
away from where people didn't talk right anymore. Each
group wrote its own g_rammar, and thus the universal

I collect my paycheck
at Calvin
for pushing the _dialect
of academia.

Babel
Revisited:
Some
Observations
on Language
Stanley _W iersma

language was destroyed. Each people had its own distinct
language, never to be·changed.
In such a view a dialect is at best an ·oddity and at worst
a symptom of linguistic laziness, hostility, and downright
depravity. Mistakes in language are then moral faults. In
this essay I shall first defend taking an appreciative interest
in dialects and mistakes. Next, I shall survey briefly the
several methods of language study and argue why I choose
the method I do for teaching grammar in English 100. Then
I shall conclude with a brief word on how my attitude
toward dialects and errors colors my method.
The first inkling I had that linguistic affairs were not as
simple as the Sunday school version of the Babel story was
a Chaucer course I took with Dr. John Timmerman a year
or more after I had graduated from Calvin. Dr. Timmerman
insisted that we pronounce the vowels with, not their
modern-English, but with the continental values. Pronounced that way, English sounded more like Dutch than I
had realized before. It was my first awareness of the
evolution of languages.
For English was not spoken at all at Babel. English did
not exist at all before the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes invaded
.Britai~ in the middle of the fifth century A.D. Their
language then was only barely distinguishable from Old
Frisian-the speakers of which language, as we all know, did
not migrate to Britain-and not distinguishable at all from
the Old Saxon which metamorphosed into Dutch. At
bottom English is as Germanic a language as the German
spoken in Berlin.
No Germanic language was spoken at Babel. Jakob
Grimm's discovery in the nineteenth century that all of the
major European languages are related to each other by an
evolutionary process of linguistic change proved that the
Germanic languages were not there from the start. Grimm
worked with pairs like the following:

21

La tin ego, Dutch ik
Latin genu, German k nie
Latin ager, English acre
Grimm observed not only that wherever Latin, Greek, or
Sanskrit has a /g/ Germanic languages had a /k/, but that
where Latin, Greek, or Sanskrit had /b/ Germanic languages
had /p/, and where those non-Germanic languages had /d/
Germanic languages had /t/. These are only three sound
changes of some twelve, each of them documented with
long lists of words. Grimm's conclusion, never seri?usly
debated since its formulation: Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, all
the Germanic languages, and all the Celtic languages (like
Welsh and Gaelic) were derived from one parent language,
which Grimm called Indo-European. One by one tribes got
cross and moved away from the parent Indo-European
tribe-one over a mountain range, another across a river,
another across a sea, another simply away-and after several
centuries the tribes no longer understood the parent
language or each other. Whatever happened at Babel was
not the instant production of all the world's languages, but
the beginning of a process of language-making: Separation
between people causes differences between their languages,
and differences between their languages cause greater
separation.
When differences between the mother language and the
language of an alienated community withi~ _it are insir
ificant enough so that the two commumt1es can sttll
understand each other, we call the alienated language a
dialect. When an individual is alienated from a group to the
extent that it makes his language a little different from that
of the group-and everyone is so alienated-his _language _is
called an idiolect. Every language beings as a dialect-mistakes, if you will--:-within a mother language, and every dialect
begins as an idiolect. If a speaker persuades others to say
the mistakes as he or she does, the idiolect becomes a
dialect, and if the speakers of a dialect acquire suffi_c ient
influence or power so that neighboring speakers begm to
imitate them, then the dialect becomes a _language.
When the French-speaking Normans conquered England
in 1066, the capital moved from Winchester to London. As
a result the London dialect (East Anglian, as modified byFrench)1 became the basis for standard English . Along with
political influence, Winchester lost linguistic influence.
Before 1066, texts written in the isolation of Northumbria
show West Saxon forms and expressions, from Winchester;
after 1066, Northumbrian texts show East Anglian forms
and expressions. Northumbria began to be influenced by
the East Anglican dialect, not because it was considered by
competent judges to be a superior dialect, but because
London was now the center of political power and cultural
fashion. The decision what should become the standard was
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made without anyone's having consciously made it.
An even better example for making my point about
dialect is what happened to Latin-not to the teaching of it,
but to the language itself. · It is simply false to say that Latin
died. Latih is going strong in 197 5 in its offspring
"dialects:" Italian, Spanish, Portguese, and French, each of
these dialects having by now acquired language status. One
never thinks of French as being odd 'Latin, or Spanish as ·
being lazy Latin, or Italian as being immoral Latin.
But suppose for the sake of argument that all d_iale~ts ~re
examples of linguistic depravity. No amount of mve1ghmg
against mistakes will make France at _this late date go ~ack
to ·a pure form of Latin, for all the mistakes have long smce
been standardized. The standardization of mistakes is
exactly what is involved in a dialect's becoming language.
When Renaissance Englishmen began to pronounce my
as we know it rather than as our me, when they began to
pronounce me as we know it rather than as our ~ay, and
when they began pronouncing may as we know 1t rather
than as our my, these new pronunciations were all mistakes.
Nor will it do to argue that they were changing them from a
wrong pronunciation to a right one. Saying my as we say
me was as right for medieval Englishmen as our saying my
and me and meaning by them what we mean.
Or take folk etymologies-mistaken pickings-up of
words-that have become correc;:t: Englishmen misheard the
Dutch donderbuss ("thunder box," said of a kind of gun) as
blunderbuss, misheard the French appentis (for a house
attached to another building on top) as penthouse, and the
Hindi tipai ("tripod") as teapoy, now a stand for a tea
service. Would it be worth the effort to correct the
mistakes, to purge the language from error?
Sum man haefde twegen suna was the correct way to say
A certain man had two sons in Old English. At least twenty
mistakes in language had not only to be made, but to be
standardized in order to make the latter sentence possible.
The declension for dual number in Old English-very useful
for distinguishing "we two" (wit) from "we three or more"
(we )-fell away when Anglo-Saxons made the mistake of
using the plural for both . Objective, dative, and instrumental cases in Old English all fell into one case, the
objective, because Anglo-Saxons made mistakes. ~ny _sentence we say in English is the result of conventionalized
mistakes, no matter how rigorously it conforms to the rules
in Harper's Handbook . Mistakes and dialects are the means
by which languages change.
.
.
The first prescriptive English grammars were written m
the eighteenth century, the mo,t famous and influential
being ·Robert Lowth's. Bishop Lowth knew nothing about
the history of the English language, but he knew Latin
grammar well. He applied the grammar of Latin to
English whether it fit or not. It is impossible to use a
preposition at the end of a Latin sentence, and hen~e he
made it a rule never to end an English sentence with a
preposition. Bishop Lowth did not realize that prepositions
had been used at the ends of English sentences since Old
English times as well as in all the other Ger~~ic lan~ages,
Ik kan er niet bij being a Dutch example. It 1s lffiposs1ble to
split an infinitive in Latin, the infinitive form being a
single word in that language; all right, infinitives would

no longer be split in English even, though both Chaucer and Shakespeare had done so. Lowth also formulated six tense for verbs on the· Latin model, though
English since earliest times had only two tenses, present and past, with a large group of modal auxiliaries,
each giving a certain temperature to the verbs. And so I
shall go is future tense in Lowth's system, though,
arbitrarily, / should go is present, should being a modal
auxiliary and go an "understood" infinitive. I shall have
been being seen has never, I am sure, occurred in English
discourse, but Lowth made a slot for the future perfect
passive progressive to round out his diagram. He aiso made
the rule against double negatives, as though language were
mathematics, ignoring the fact that from Beowulf through
Shakespeare as many as three negatives pile up in a row
reinforcing each other. Without consulting anyone, Lowth
also fabricated a purely arbitrary distinction between shall
and will, though they had been used interchangeably until
· his time.
Though he gave passing tribute to Latin as .the readymake universal grammar, Lowth's real purpose in writing
his grammar was etiquette: giving citizens of the rising
middle class, many of them not having studied Latin, access
to a method of self-improvement. My intention is not to
minimize Lowth's achievement. Using Latin grammar to
describe the English language works surprisingly well. The
trouble with Lowth's nonce system is that it got institutionalized over the next two centuries as the very system
that God had delivered at Babel, and any deviation from it
was seen as a weakening of the absolute.
·
The authority of Lowth's system went unchallenged
until the twentieth century. Lowth 's system described
much about English, but not everything. It worked best for
people who already knew the English language,·but is was
virtually useless for foreigners, especially non-Europeans.
Descriptive linguists-Bloomfield, Fries, Pike, Trager
and Smith-make up the first major school of linguists to
challenge Lowth 's system. These descriptivists and structuralists deny the existence of linguistic universals; they
begin and end the study of each language with the
application of stimulus-response theory to that particular
language alone. Behavioristic in their psychological theory,
these linguists concentrate on describing the melodies of
English sentences. Using terms · like pitch, stress, and
juncture, with precise definitions for each·, they manage to
describe in print what spoken English sounds like, so that
non-native speakers of English can learn to · speak the
language without an accent. This school of linguists has
phenomenal success in applying its theories to foreign
languages too, preparing spies during World War II and
preparing missionaries after World War II. The Wycliff Bible
Translators work largely by this method. And yet, as our
own late Dr. Zylstra never tired of pointing out, any theory
of language based on behaviorist psychology is a denial of
the Christian view of man, regardless of how many converts
to Christianity it chalks up. Arguing against descriptivists
and structuralists philosophically, Zylstra's only appeal
practically was to the traditional grammar of Lowth's kind.
And thus a book that had been designed to help up-andcoming merchants and their wives to speak more like their

new neighbors than like their old neighbors-the book itself
already forgotten, but its precepts still observed-became
· our only defense against structural linguistics.
Zylstra died before the transformational-generative
grammar of Noam Chomsky came into its own. Working
with meaning and syntax, regarding traditional grammar
respectfully while demonstrating its weaknesses, Chomsky
developed a system of linguisti'c rules for generating every
conceivable kind of sentence out of a simple kernal .
sentence. Behind the empirical evidence of particular
languages, Chomsky sees a universal grammar which must
still be discovered. Descriptivists gleefully bring up languages in which subject-predicate sentences 'do not occur,
like Turkish, to prove that each language is totally separate
from every other once it has achiev·e language status.
Chomsky argues that Turkish has subject-predicate relationships, though not expressed by word order or by inflectional endings. For . behind the empirical structures of
language Chomsky sees what he calls deep structure, the
structuring of human · rationality being implicit in anything
a person says. At its deepest level, says Chomsky, this
rational patterning is universal. .
While descriptive linguists had only scorn for traditional
grammar of Lowth 's kind, Chomsky has appreciation for
. how well it works and for its concern with universals. True,
traditional grammar does not give a complete description of
any lahguage; traditional grammer simply proclaims itself
the universal grammar without doing its homework. But
those limitations are no more severe than the,limitations of
the descriptive grammar.
And so we are left with three grammars: 1) Traditional
grammar is the least complete, though by far the most easy
to master in a short time, especially for native speakers of
English. 2) Descriptive-behaviorist grammar, though a complete statement of the sounds of English, remains weak on
syntax and on the relationship of meaning to form. 3)
Chomsky's transformational-generative grammar, strong on
syntax, remains weak on describing sounds and does not
have the Gee-Whiz kind of success that the descriptivists
can claim. Philosophically, the descriptivists are so far
removed from the transformationalists that it will be a
generation or more until a unified grammar is written.
Choosing among partial grammars is difficult, especially
since both descriptive grammar and transformational grammar keep adjusting their systems to accomodate what each
considers salvagable in the opposite system. The grammars
will not stay put long enough to teach; by the end of the
course the course itself will be obsolete. Traditional
grammar, with all of its incompleteness and arbitrariness, is
at least definite. I continue to teach it in English 100,
especially since only part of a semester is allowed for
grammar in that course. It can be mastered in a short time,
it contains enough description of sentence patterns to allow
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students to experiment with unfamiliar styles, and one
knows exactly what one knows having studied it. Choosing
among partial grammars is difficult, which is why most
high-school teachers teach no grammar of any kind.
An so pragmatically-exactly the rationale Zylstra so
abhorred in the self-defense of descriptive grammar-I
choose traditional grammar, though without any illusions
that in uncovering the structures in English that are similar
to Latin structures we have probed beyond Babel to a
linguistic absolute. I am sure that the Chomsky approach to
language is sounder, but it takes at least a full-year course
for students to feel free with, and one cannot know when
one has mastered it finally, because it is still a system in the
making.
Much as I admire Zylstra's opposition to descriptive
linguistics, I must deplore his defense of traditional
grammar as an absolute. Chomsky too opposed descriptive
grammar, and his opposition became transformational
grammar. I immediately forgive Zylstra, of course, for not
being Chomsky. Literature was Zylstra's concern more than
language, and it is unfair to require that, in addition to
doing Shakespeare and contemporary poetry and Reformed
Journal on campus, he should have done all the work of
Noam Chomsky too. And yet, wonder why Noam Chomsky
did not appear among us? We had the anti-behaviorist bias,
the impatience with descriptive linguists, an interest in
linguistic universals, and the philosophical-intellectual
equipment to ·do the job. How odd that we did not beat
Chomsky to it. Is it because when threatened by a new idea
hostile to our Christianity we turn instinctively to reiterating a conservative position rather than developing a new
one? I keep thinking that it will need one of us-somebody
with a lifetime to give to the project-to decide what is
. salvagable in descriptive grammar, to integrate in into
Chomsky's system, to produce the most complete English
grammar ever, and perhaps even to get a handle on that
universal grammar that Chomsky so hankers after.
I have said that I teach traditional grammar on pragmatic
grounds. I conclude with a word on how I try to teach it. I
teach traditional grammar as the dialect of educated people,
which company anybody who enters college presumably is
eager to join. To make it in academia, one needs this special
dialect, and whoever does not master this dialect ought not
to pass English 100. Flunking English as a freshman prods a
student at exactly the right time to decide wpether to drop
academia or to learn the language of academia. It is not a
bagatelle for a student to have spent four, six, eight years at
college and university, only to discover that the final
dissertation is so badly written that it cannot be accepted
or that the letter of application is rejected because of
semi-literacy. I collect my paycheck at Calvin for pushing
the dialect of academia.
But having said that, I hasten to add that the dialect of
academia is only a dialect among other dialects. Not to
master it is not necessarily a moral fault; mistakes in using
academic dialect are breaches in etiquette, but not threats
to the moral order. Nor is academic dialect intrinsically
more expressive than a dialect that a student brings from
home. Non-standard Black you all, for example, allows a clear
and useful distinction between second person singular and
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plural; Yankee Dutch under through allows a distinction
between and under-and-staying-there. Useful as it is to know
standard English, especially in academia, there is no reason
why the Black student and the Yankee Dutch student,
having mastered academic dialect, should not continue to
use their folk dialects at home. The more dialects a person
masters, the greater the variety of communities open to
him-just as knowing more than one's own language opens a
greater variety of cross-cultural experiences. What snobbery
it is to say that once a dialect has achieved language status
· it is worth study, but before graduation to language status a
dialect is worth only contempt. We admire bilingualism, in
. and out of academia; it is time we admired bidialecticalism
too.
A student's folk speech must be marked wrong when it
intrudes into an essay in standard English, but the mistake
lies in getting the dialects confused, not in knowing a wrong
dialect that never should have happened. In fact, to the
extent that a teacher is interested in the phenomenon of
language, that -intrusive dialect is more intrinsically interested than the standardized grammar text. The history of
any language is the history of dialects turning into
languages ·and of mistakes being standardized. The teacher
walks a tightrope: from the point of view of the standard
dialect to be learned and taught, intrusive dialect must be
condemned; from the point of view of the teacher's own
interest in language and the student's pride in being ethnic,
the error must be appreciated: The dialects and mistakes
that have been standardized began with as little sophistication as the folk dialects that intrude into our student's
essays.
The way the Tower-of-Babel story used to be told when
I was a child was wrong, but it was not dull, with every
language suddenly in full-blown conflict with every other
language. The story is an interesting as ever, except that
now we ourselves are actors in it, new dialects and
languages forming all around us. True, the old version of
the story regarded languages as static and absolute; linguistic relativity can be hard to live with, especially for teachers
of English. I have been questioning in · this essay whether
linguistic affairs have ever been as absolute as the old
version of the story implied. Misconstruing the absolute as
relativity is the risk I run, and another name for it is
blasphemy. But misconstruing what is in fact relative as
though it were absolute is the opposite error, and another
name for that is idolatry.

.~'

Cal Niemeyer ·

Lee Doezema

Break
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Heiman Dullaert:
·nutch Metaphysical Poet

Henrietta Ten Harrnsel
During the last two decades various Dutch Protestant poets of the seventeenth century have become known as
"metaphysical poets." Jacobus Revius (1586-1658) and Constantijn Huygens (1596-1687) have been translated into
and widely read and analyzed in English. Two of their successors, now greatly admired by Dutch critics and readers,
certainly merit equally careful translation and analysis in English. Jeremias De Decker ( 1609-1666) is best know for the
long poem Good Friday, a deeply moving, baroque portrait of Christ's Passion. At the end of the Dutch metaphysical
period, Heiman Dullaert (1636-1684) refined and rejuvenated some or' its peculiar characteristics in his unique lyrics.
The following sonnets by Dullaert demonstrate the generai metaphysical phenomena of paradox, intellectual conceits,
conversational intimacy, and the resoiution of apparent contradictions within a unifying religious vision. They reflect
also the intense passion, extravagant wit, and aesthetic integrity peculiar to Dullaert as well as the typically Dutch
coales:ing of Biblical events with the poet's personal religious experience.
Dullaert's sonnet on Gethsemane compares the blood, sweat, and pain of Christ in the garden for countless sinners
with the tears He shed over one wicked Jerusalem. In the macabre closing metaphor of the Saviour's pores as eyes,
Dullaert seems desperately to reach for some figure by which he may measure the extent of Christ's compassion:

Christ in the Garden

Christus in 't Hofken

What clots of red besmear this fertile ground?
Are you undone by hell, death .. law, and sin?
Has love consumed your heart in its hot glow,
Your melting heart, pressed out through clothes and skin?

Wat rode klonteren besmeuren deze gronden?
Wordt gij van zonde en wet, van dood en helle omringd?
Zeg, heeft de liefde uw hart in haren gloed verslonden,
Uw hart, dat smeltende door huid en kleedren dringt?

Has God's wrath sent an arrow through your bowels,
An arrow which so sharply twists and wrings
That, oh, its wound bleeds out in countless bursts?
That from each pore a purple fountain springs?

Heeft u Gods toorn een pijl in'tingewand gezonden,
Die uw beangst gemoed zo vinnig praamt en wringt,
Dat zijne wonde, ooi mij ! bloedt uit ontelbre wonden,
Dat uit elk zweetgat, ach, een purpere ader springt?

But since, dear Lord; with sympathetic cries
Two streams of water sprang from your two eyes
For one Jerusalem, one wicked town,

Maar hebt gij eertijds, Heer, uit teder mededogen
Twee waterstromen uit twee zielbeminnende ogen
Om een Jerusalem, die gruwelstad, verspreid,

No wonder that to take away our sinThe horrors of so many thousand menNow thousand bloodstreams from a thousand eyes flow down.

Is 't wonder dat gij dan, in onze s:huld getreden,
Om zo veel gruwelen van zo veel duizend steden
Nu duizend stromen bloeds uit duizend ogen schreit?
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On the Spear Which Pierced His Side with its conversational immediacy also combines the searing reality of Christ's
pain with the poignant awareness of the Christian's participation in its cause:

On the Spear Which Pierced His Side

Op de Speer, Die Zijne Zijde Doorstak

Stop it, demented Spear! Stop piercing his pure breast,
For my ungratefulness, alas, has done it, too,
And by its worldly lust anticipated you
And in that anguished heart has pierced the heart of God.

Hou op, verwoede Speer, D'onnoozle borst te breken:
Want mijne ondankbaarheit heeft reeds, wee mij! te wreet
Door al te laffe weelde uw vinnich ampt bekleedt,
En in dat quijnend hart God zelf naar 't hart gesteken.-

But now I feel Remorse remove that sword again:
See here what blood my heart is sweating through my eyesSuch healing dew that I can hardly realize
Whether these fountains rich have blood or balm in them.

Maar ik voel door 't Berouw die punt te rug geweken;
En zie, wat bloet mijn hart ook door mijn oogen zweet;
Doch zulk een heelzaam vocht, dat mijne ziel niet weet,
of deze bronnen rijkst van bloet of balsem leken.

0 Savior, bleeding so! 0 sinner, weeping so!
Combine this fount and fount, unite this heart to heart,
What bitter sweetness then! What comfort pain imparts!
O Spear, the sign of love that sets my faith aglow,
Come, open up that breast; I'm longing for the day
That I may melt in it, in it may glide away.

Ach Heiland, die zoo bloet! ach Zondaar, die zoo weent!
Gingt gij eens vocht aan vocht, en hart aan hart vereent,
Wat zoeter bitterheit! wat troostelijker lijden!
0 Speer! die mijn geloove een schilt der liefde zijt,
Korn, open fluks die borst, ik hijge al naar den tijd,
Dat ik 'er smelten mag, dat ik 'er in mag glijden . .

The Blessed Draught of Fish reflects something of George Herbert in its fervent devotion to the church, something
of Richard Crashaw in its hyperbolic "sea of tears, 11 and something of John Donne in its concluding paradox. In its
telescoping of the Biblical scene with the poet's religious yearnings, however, it is typically Dutch and typically
Dullaert:
·

The Blessed Draught of Fish

De Zegenrijke Vangst

You who go fishing in the wet seawave,
And to those thankless tongues that long to eat
Present your hook and line with tempting bait
To give their death through food to those who live;

Gy die ter Visschery door't zeenat pleegt te streven,
En voor d'ondankbre tong, die naar den wellust helt,
Den weerhaak aan de lyn door list hebt toegestelt,
Om aan den levenden de dood door spys te geven:

Who now have set yourself to fish for men
On awful oceans, rocked with violence,
And ply your fishing with such diligence
That there the very dead find life again;

Die nu, op menschenvangst verwonderlyk bedreven,
Op eenen oceaan van gruwlen en gewelt
Het vischtuig van uw ampt met zulk een aas verzelt,
Dat door d'onthouding zelfs de dooden doet herleven.

0, skillful fishers, come, row over here
Where my sad eyes send out a sea of tears,
Present my longing heart with holy bait.

Ervare Visschers komt, komt herwaarts aangeroeit,
Daar uit myn boetgraag oog een zee van tranen vloeit,
Verschaft uw zalig aas myn afgevast verlangen.

Cast out to me your blessed gospel net;
Draw me into the church, that holy boat:
To be forever free, I must be caught.

Werpt hier het heilzaam net van uwe leere eens uit.
En haalt my in de kerk, kie geestelyke schuit.
Om eeuwig vry te zyn laat ik my tydig vangen.

Dr. Ten Harmsel's translations from Dullaert and the accompanying commentary will form part of an article which she
is presently writing for a special "Dutch issue" of Review of National Literatures, a journal which devotes each of its
issues to the literature of one particular country.
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the problem simply put ...
how to dust off man's
self
alive yet dead
to make
dead
alive.

By the Sea of Crystal, Saints ...

in the beginning
God turned plato's
cave inside out and
before the dust settled
man
was,
completeness sealed by
sabbath
service
God lacked
nothing.
man full of God
glided easy in that
glow of
truth
until
the whisper
whisked
eden's rug out from
under
and the
truth tower became
thin and
snapped,

war wracked heaven and
earth and God puzzled with
worried
wonder.
man empty of God
full of self
picked himself apart
and in
pieces
drifted off to find that
tower
again.
...meanwhile
the altar
struck with God's
gavel
startled the
prophets into taking
minutes,

the word came weakly back
from man through the
prophet
... send us a king.
the
advice was taken
the
vote was tallied
the
Father sends
Spirit
Flesh
building in His castle shop
a vessel of infinite
emptiness which
soaks up all the
fullness of man
until
the last gavel rap
signaled that
God again was
full.

Lambert Van Poolen

David Versluis
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another goodbye

my parent's bed is empty
mine is full

·

i am a woman grown
with strong legs
not wide but adequate hips
and breasts
full for a child's need

\·

we are daughters of prominent
men
we slip through back doors
of closed places
we have potential
for what ever we wish to be
can dream
and create reality
we are our father's daughters
will inherit legacies
we sleep with unknown artists
live
independently
in old city houses
are connoisseurs of fine wine
and cheap whiskey
we are daughters ~f promise
and we hold
everything that has meaning
in our capable hands

i am a woman quiet
shadowed
with eyes that see
a tongue unafraid to _say
· and ears that hear dark whispers

we are daughters

my bed is warm
my parent's lies untouched

for Judy

i am a woman grown

M. Edmund
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Interview:
Dr. Anthony Diekema

Earlier this month, Dialogue interviewed Dr. Anthony
Diekema, president-elect of Calvin College. The following is
an edited transcription of that interview.

Dr. Diekema, considering th'-= fact that you are currently
~ccessfully associated with a public university, why are
you anxious to take on the difficult job of the presidency •
at this school which has to work for its money?
Well, that's a question with many dimensions to it.
Incidentally, state institutions do indeed have to work fairly
hard for their money, although it comes from another
source. There are many similar structures, many of the
same procedures for raising money in the sense of having to
relate to state legislators, governor's staffs, boards of higher
education and so forth ... much as a private institution,
and particularly ~n institution like Calvin, needs to relate to
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a constituency. So, just by way of introduction, there are
many more structural similarities between private and
public institutions than appear on the surface.
But, more · importantly, I think your question is focused
on my own rationale for making a shift from a major,
well-established, prestigious university to a sound, private,
Christian liberal arts college. There are many reasons for
that, but, putting it info brief perspective, I have always
had a continuing interest in Christian higher education,
even though I have been a part of public higher education. I
have always followed Calvin with considerable interest.
There have been occasions prior to this one when I debated
very seriously whether to join the staff in one capacity or
another. So, Calvin has been a continuing part of my life, in
a sense.
In addition to that, I was a part of the Trinity Christian
College establishment serving on its Board of Curators for a
period of time. I was chairman of that Board, and that
involved me in the proqlems of private, Christian higher
education. But it is true· that I have now spent twenty years
in public h1gher education, resulting in a vision of higher
education which suggests the strategic importance of what
Christian education has to offer in the decade ahead. We're
entering into a decade of very serious problems. The
student enrollment is beginning to stabilize, and institutions
will increasingly be called upon, I think, to establish their
own distinctiveness in terms of the unique contribution
they can make to the total educational enterprise. I think
many institutions are in deep trouble in that regard, and
many institutions are scurrying around trying to find their
own distinctiveness. Many of them are almost destroying
themselves . in the process · because they're trying to be
everything to everybody, and they're failing.
Along with that phenomenon, there's also a general
disenchantment with higher education in American society.
A decade ago higher education was the dream, and no one
really attacked it. Then came the late sixties and quite a
shift in societal attitudes toward higher education. Jhis
included student disturbances, faculty discontent, and a
general surfacing of dissatisfaction which, I think, turned
the general public against higher education. That has
dissipated somewhat, but education hasn't returned to the
status in American .society it once had. Consequently,
higher education is being called upon to account for itself
in ways that it never has before, and I think the decade
ahead is a strategic time for the sound Christian institution
to make its unique mark in higher education, and, in doing
that, make a considerable contribution in the entire higher
education arena.
Then would it be correct to say that you don't perceive
the role of Christian colleges as a retreat from the secular
world?
Right. It's an extending outward of what these institutions have had for a long time but have been keeping to
themselves. It's now looking outward and saying to oneself
as an institution: "What cari we be contributing to that
larger community that we are not contributing today?" I
think there are any number of opportunities to do that, and
those will become increasingly apparent in the days ahead.
One of the reasons for this is that institutions-and I've

alluded to this earlier-are looking for purpose. They're
looking for meaning, and they're looking for a reason for ·
being. This has been the strength of Christian higher
education; it's clearly been the strength of Calvin College.
There's never been any doubt about the purpose of Calvin
College: the attempt to articulate and to implement the
Reformed world and life view, if you will, trying to respond
to the mandate of Scripture to place Jcsus Christ at the
center of life. This doesn't mean that we're going to be able
to sell the Christian perspective to all of higher education;
I'm confident that will not be the case. But it will have an
impact, and that Christian perspective will have a broader
distribution simply because they will be looking at us to see
what makes Christian institutions so stable, purpos~ful, and
timely at this stage of higher education development.
We should, as Christian institutions, continue to put
increasing numbers of our graduates in public higher
education-where I spent the last twenty years of my life.
We also ought to mobilize those people who are already in
public higher education, and see if we can, as a community
of scholars and Christians in the business of higher
education, identify where these contributions can best be
made, and how they can best be realized. We have been
fairly good, I think, at articulating the purpose of Christian
higher education; but perhaps less effective in really
implementing it outside of our somewhat closed Christian
community. We must now address implementation more
intensively.

How can you a_s Calvin's president implement this
vision?
I don't think · I can do it alon·e as Calvin's president. As
president, I would see the challenge as trying to bring
together that critical mass of faculty and others who h_ave a
vision and who are similarly inclined to ad.dress some of the
issues. I would hope that kind of leadership would be well
received. With that kind of orientation we can collectively
get on with the difficult task at hand.
How do you perceive your relationship with the faculty
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right now? Do you feel as though you have their support?
I don't really feel anything at the moment about faculty
support because I'm not on the scene, and, until I am, I
can't assess the kind of support I'll really get. I have no
reason, however, to think that the faculty will not be
supportive. In the presidential search process, while I was
still trying to make a decision about whether this was an
appropriate move for me, and the search committee was in
turn assessing me, I had some intensive interaction with a
· number of faculty members. Out of those experiences, I
would have no reason to think that the faculty is not
oriented toward many of the same objectives and goals for
Calvin that I am. Only if I as a person would alienate the
faculty in some way, would I expect a lack of support.

It seems that because President Spoclhof has been here
so long, and because so much has happened during his
tenure that the change in presidents becomes more important than it would be otherwise. Do you have any specific
plans for b~ilding rapport with students, with constituency,
and with faculty?
I don't have a detailed plan of how this is to be
accomplished, but I have some general notions of how this
needs to be done. I think what simply has to be established
very early is an open, honest relationship with mutual trust
and mutual respect. I have for a long time admired the
faculty that has gathered at Calvin, so I respect them
highly. Therefore, I'm not concerned about their -being less
·than open and tolerant. But I do think the fact that
President Spoelhof has been here for twenty-five years does
cast a different light on developing that relationship, simply
because most of the faculty were recruited during President
Spoelhof's presidency and know only his style of leadership.
Looking at it from the outside, I can see where there
would be a degree of anxiety about any new president,
particularly someone from the outside. The uniqueness of
this event has placed a certain significance on it. So I have a
feeling for the ne~d to establish early routes of communication and rapport with the faculty. The same, of course,
holds true · for students and constituents. But I won't
structure it highly; as a matter of fact, I think one could
very easily structure it too highly .
What is your philosophy of administration? Will it vary
much from President Spoelhof's style?
I guess I'm not the best person to assess that, simply
because I don't know as much about President Spoelhof's
style as I w.o uld if I had been on the scene. But I do know
something about the style in which I feel most comfortable.
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That style is essentially one that consults fairly broadly on
most issues among faculty, constituency, students and
others. In other words, I like to approach problems from a
broad base with fairly wide deliberation, but, then, I'd also
like to force some direction out of that process.
Deliberation can go on forever, and I think one of the
roles of an administrator is to determine when the point of
decision has come. When the decision is made, the
expectation is that everyone will support it-that everyone
puts a shoulder to the wheel and gets on with it. My style
has never been defined, at least from what people have been
willing to tell me, as an authoritative style or as a directive
style; but rather as one of broad consultation, then pressing
forward toward implementation. I don't expect that style
to change.
As president, do you feel that you are ultimately
responsible to the constituency, to the faculty or to the
students? This question has come up in the past when, for
·example, a constituent complains about a poem published
in Dialogue.
You've used the word "responsible," and I think that
the role of president is one that carries considerable
responsibility-not necessarily personal responsibility for
the act, but responsibility for explaining perhaps the
circumstances surrounding an event or its overall rationale.
Certainly the responsibility to articulate the purpose of the
institution and how certain events contribute in one way or
another to that purpose is the responsibility of the ·
president. Constituents often have different expectations
and visions of what the institution should be. Again, that's
not unique among private institutions or church-related
institutions; it's also true in public institutions.
There are many constituents to whom a president inust
relate who have quite varying views on what the role of that
institution is and what it should be doing. Therefore, a
president has to be able to relate to the various dimensions
of the constituency and must be able to respond to
conflicts that arise. The president must also realize that
there will always be events that may not contribute to the
positive development of the college, and which may indeed
be the subject of legitimate criticism.
In recent years there have been a number of controversies that have arisen regarding the freedom of artistic
expression in student publications, in plays, and in the
visual arts. What are your feelings regarding limitations of
student expression? How will you approach these kinds of
questions?
I guess I don't know enough about some of the ways in
which student groups are currently organized to respond
well. But I would expect the role of the faculty in a
community of Christian scholars to be a constant consultative and advisory group regarding-if you're referring to
student publications-what kind of artistic material should
or should not appear. I would hope that this not become
censorship but, rather, a dialogue-if you'll forgive the
pun-a dialogue withi~ that community to try and gain an
appreciation of what are the implications of a certain mode
of expression. I don't think you can structure it too highly
because then it's going to become censorship, and it's going
to become less than effective. But if we can maintain a

spirit of ·mutual responsibility within the broader Christian
community which includes students, faculty, staff and
constituency, we ought to be able to accomplish a
broadly-based and responsible approach to these questions.
A great deal of the problems in the past have arisen over
the place of the artist within the Christian community.
There seems to be new consciousness of the place of arts in
the church and in Christianity. Does a work of art have to
be explicitly and selfconsciously Christian to be acceptable
within the realm of Christian art? Do you have any personal
opinions on art and Christianity in regard to that specific
point?
·
Let me address that question from a little different
direction which . I think is particularly illustrative and
appropriate when talking about art, about appreciation of
art and about what constitutes Christian art. It's almost
inevitable that these kinds of issues first are raised within
the confines of a group of scholars and artists, and,
consequently, Calvin College and its campus community is
a logical place for it to surfac~. But what it suggests to me is
the responsibility of that group of . artists and of Calvin
College and of the Calvin community to begin to share
some of that appreciation with the broader constituency;
because, you see, you can easily be out in front of an
important part of the Christian community if you ignore
them and do not try to bring them along in the understanding and "appreciation" of new cultural phenomena.
What just recently happened to this campus-a conference relating sorrie of the arts to the liturgy and to the
church-is to me an excellent approach to addressing some
of these concerns, recognizing that there is_always going to
be some healthy controversy. But that kind of exposure to
a broader base of the Christian constituency is vital to
gaining an appreciation of their views . as well as to really
address the issues together.
Does there have to be some immediately perceptable
Christian dimension to a piece of art in order for it to be ·
Christian? I'm not sure. That tal_{es dialogue; that takes a lot
of interaction; and the artists have to do that among
themselves. But they shouldn't, in doing it, ignore those
who probably aren't at the same point. And so your
question really prompts me to say that one of the
important responsibilities of a Christian academic community is to be looking constantly . for contributions it can
make to its constituency which will broaden appreciation
and broaden horizons-culturally as well as in many other
. ways.

So the college is once again in the leadership role that
you mentioned earlier: the institution leading the community. This relationship seems paradoxical because certain
elements in the constituency would not see this as
leadership but would see it as going too far.
I think that's always a precarious balance. There is no
kind of leadership, it seems to me, that doesn't have to deal
with that problem; because if you're really leading, there
are always some people who are reluctant followers. And
that always creates an almost inherent point of conflict at
which some precarious balance has to be maintained. I
think we're often inclined in academic communities to cast
negative implicatio·ns on the will_ingness of a larger constituency to follow in certain areas without always accepting the
responsibility for entering into meaningful communication
with them. That takes patience. That takes tolerance. And
inherently, I guess, we're not all as patient or tolerant as we
would like to be.

Given the present high enrollment at Calvin, do you feel
that it should maintain · its traditional "open door" policy
of admissions for members of the Christian Reformed ·
Church? If this policy affects academic quality, giould
Calvin more actively recruit non-members of the Christian
Reformed Church based on scholastic ability rather than on
religious affiliation? The question also comes up in regards
to minorities.
Well, I think admissions policy must always be related to
the academic program that's provided. In other words, you
shouldn't have an admissions policy that's urireali~tic
relative to the degree of intensity of an academic program .
My own attitude about Calvin is that its standards are high
and that it certainly has to be responsible about admitting
only those students who are likely to be well-served by
what Calvin has to offer. It's irresponsible to admit those
who are unlikely to succeed. But I_don't think that, in
practice, presents an immediate problem.
Certainly, students from other backgrounds who meet
those academic criteria and who have a sincere interest in
what Calvin has to offer from its Christian perspective
ought to be extended the privilege of ·entering Calvin
College. And I think that's been fairly true. I think there
ought to be efforts to admit an increasing number of
students from other than the fundamental ref9rmed tradi-
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tion. This again, I think, is part of the challenge of the
decade ahead: extending what we have to offer beyond a
more limited constituency.
I'm impressed by the responsible way in which many
students in high schools are evaluating colleges for their
purposes-for their perspective-far beyond what students
in my day looked at. When I came out of high school and
selected a college, students were not analyzing a college like
they are today. There are a lot of students out there who
are looking for colleges with direction, with purpose, and I
know Calvin has a great deal to offer to these students.
I think Calvin must continue to address itself to the
education of minorities for a number of reasons. I think the
Calvin community, having come out of a fairly close.:.knit,
ethnically-oriented larger · community, has much to gain
from input from minorities. I mean in many dimensionsculturally, sociologically and ·spiritually. I think in that
process we can contribute a great deal to the Christian
Reformed Church. If these minorities are attracted to what
Calvin has to offer-the Christian perspective, the world and
life view-they are potential members of the Christian
Reformed Church who then go out into society with a very
strong commitment to the view that all of life is centered
. around Jesus Christ and serving Him. To me, that is a
tremendous contribution to the church and to the constituency..
How would you respond to the increasing demand from
Calvin's co~stituency for programs stressing paraprofessional skills (so-called "salable" skills), especially since this
can come at the expense of the liberal arts education? For
example, what would you say to a Calvin supporter whose
son wants to be a bookkeeper, who has to send his son to a
secular institution and who then wonders why he should
continue to support Calvin?
Calvin is distinctive as a Christian liberal arts institution,
and it should not be willing to compromise that distinctiveness and that strength in liberal arts for paraprofessional
programs in some of these occupationally-oriented fields.
Otherwise, Calvin may fall into the same trap that many
other institutions are falling into: that is, trying to be
everything to everybody. However, I don't think there is
the paradox that one can hypothetically construct because
there are areas of professional education that require a
sound liberal arts background and core. I don't think Calvin
ought to be about the technical business of training
occupationally-oriented people in "how to do it" terms
because that's very likely to be destructive to some other
efforts that Calvin ought to be making.
On the other hand, I think there is the potential for new
program development in a number of fields that might be
called professionally-oriented, as opposed to occupationally-oriented. Let's take as an example mass communications, because there's been some discussion on campus
about a · program in mass communications. It seems to me
that to produce a professional in mass communications,
you must provide a fairly sound liberal arts background.
Mass communications, broadly conceived, must deal with
the psychology, the sociology, the art of communications,
and it gets you into many of the fundamental liberal arts
fields. Yet, there has to be a certain clinical orientation in
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that you must get out into the mass media arena, and you
must learn some things about what's going on out there .
· That means you must probably strike out a bit beyond
what has traditionally been called liberal arts. I think Calvin
ought to pursue that; I think we ought to at least address
that question-"What does it take beyond the sound base of
liberal arts to produce a good mass communications
professional?" And will that do violence to the liberal arts
strength and distinctiveness of Calvin? Perhaps not. In any
event, it's a good example of an area in which Calvin can
perhaps make a distinctive contribution. I see communications as a field where Christians have to be. Now one of the
best ways to get them there may be to bring them to Calvin
College, · to give them the expertise they need, and to put
them back out there. I believe the payoff could be
tremendous.
That's as opposed to the example of the bookkeeper.
Now, on a broader base, probably we ought to address the
question: "Is there any merit in a Christian bookkeeping
institution?" I don't mean to restrict that to bookkeeping;
should we have a technical institute that offers bookkeeping and any number of other things-two year programs,
one year programs? I'm not sure that we should. But if we
should, perhaps it ought to be a separate, self-standing
organization.
Trinity Christiai{ College is developing programs in
business, for example, and they're giving it emphasis.
Perhaps there are some areas where Christian higher
education can and should get involved, but let's not all get
involved in it. I guess what I'm saying is if Trinity goes
increasingly in that direction, then perhaps Calvin ought to
be cautious in develpping in an identical direction. Somehow
Christian higher education institutions are going to have to
take an increasingly cooperative and complementary stance,
rather than a competitive stance. Competition is going to
get very severe in the decade ahead unless we pay attention
to distinctiveness in what we can do well.

That leads into the question of this new institution in
Canada, and the whole Toronto movement with some of its

concomitant crit1c1sms of Calvin for not being Christian
enough, of not being explicitly Christian enough in their
education. Do you see it as fruitless to set up this
institution which should most likely compete with Calvin?
I don't know enough about the institution that's being
planned in Canada to speak intelligently about it. I think it
may be a little different, in the sense that it's across
national boundaries, and there may be some quite different
reasons for establishing it in Canada which I'm not aware
of. I guess the first question I would ask in addressing that
would be, "Is there something that Calvin should be do_ing
for its Canadian constituency that it has neglected to do?" I
would be very quick to say let's look at that question, and
let's see whether there's something we can do to make
Calvin be more responsive to them.
Now I don't know that it is a problem. But if that were
the reason for establishing a separate institution in Canada,
then I think it's probably the wrong reason. Certainly, as
the president-elect of Calvin College, I would hope that we
can continue to attract Canadian students to Calvin. And
from that simple practical perspective, I wish they wouldn't
start that new institution. But that's an uninformed view;
there may be some very good .reasons for starting it.
Historically, Calvin has emphasized teaching above scholarship. There has even been a negative attitude towards
advanced scholarship-saying that professors are here to
teach, not necessarily to be good scholars and to do a lot of
research. What is your attitude towards that?
1· would hope that we could, at Calvin, place some
renewed interest in research. I'd like to encourage more
faculty research of various types. I know Calvin's faculty
has the capability of doing high-level research. Some, I
think, have been impeded from doing that because they do
have heavy teaching loads; there's no question about it. I
would not want to promote research at the expense of
teaching, because I think that quality teaching is a .
distinctive feature of Calvin which should not be diminished. On the other hand, there's a potential for research in
the Calvin faculty that we must tap.
·
However, if you're going to do good research, it means
that you're going to have to have lighter teaching loads.
When there are lighter teaching loads, it means it's going to
cost more to run the institution. Therefore, we have to find
resources to do ·research. There are ways of doing that,
which I'll say more about later. I also think there's a good
deal more research that can be done which deals directly
with the issues facing our society and constituency. I'm
talking about research on some major issues of the day:
hunger, environment, energy, all of those things. Looking at
those problems from a Christian perspective can make not
only a unique contribution to the discipline at large, but
also to the Christian community. I think these are some
important efforts which can make a pretty broad-based
contribution to the fundamental purpose of Calvin College.
Research in higher education generally gives a status to
faculty · and institution that's appreciated by funding , agencies. · Good research will attract funding of research.
Therefore, if you have established researchers who are
doing good research work, they will also attract funds to do
research. Perhaps a place to begin would be to think about

the organization of a kind of "research center" where
faculty could do research for well-defined commitments of
time. Perhaps one could take a year in which he teaches
only one course and works on a major research project the
rest of the time. Perhaps the project could be funded by an
outside agency or organization which is interested in that
research. A considerable amount of research coming into
the institution could essentially pay for itself.
With a minimal contribution from the institution,
perhaps we · could administer an increasingly sophisticated
research center. But, you see, it's cyclical. One has to have
productive researchers to draw funds; one has to have funds
to pay for research. It's a chicken-egg kind of relationship.
So, I think there should be some commionents made to
research efforts by faculty with that persuasion and with
that capability. If that can happen, the potential payoff i~
many-faceted. It'll make contributions to the constituency;
it will make contributions to the higher education community; it will make contributions, internally, to students; and
it will have a positive payoff in teaching. I'm persuaded it
will, because I've found, despite what some people may tell
you, most good researchers tend also to be good teachers.
They may not do as much teaching as you would like them
to do, but they generally are good teachers. I think where a
faculty mem:ber is so inclined, doing some research is likely
to also strengthen his teaching. For that reason also, I think
research ought to be given increased emphasis within the
constraints of cost which will . be with us throughout the
next decade.
Finally, the previous question leads into the question of
the judging of the competence of the faculty. There has
been, I believe, for the last two years, a small booklet issued
by some students purporting to judge the quality of a
certain faculty member in a course as a guide for students.
Do you have any feelings toward student evaluation of
faculty or towards the ideas of relating wages to quality? .
I think student evaluations can be useful for the teaching
effectiveness of faculty. But they do have to be interpreted
cautiously, in the sense that the evaluation really mtist be
directed to the manner of teaching and to the content of
teaching, as opposed to some personality quirks. I've been a
part of a couple of institutions which have published booklets as you described. Many of them are deficient in the
sense that they often pick up on little personality variables
and tend to evaluate a. faculty member negatively because
of a fringe characteristic rather than the real content and
structure of the course. So I think there are certain
limitations to .it.
But on the other hand, I think student evaluations can
be useful. They're the most useful to the faculty member
himself. I think any evaluation of faculty from an administrative perspective must be multi-faceted. In other words,
that evaluation has to come from a number of directions,
and student input to that is an important part, but it also
has to come from colleagues-from peers who can judge his
scholarly ability as well as his ability to present the
material. If the student evaluation is used for nothing more
than to give the faculty member feedback as to how he's
being viewed, it's already priceless. I think student evaluation has to be one dimension of faculty evaluation.
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